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I. Introduction. 
A. There's a supposed problem that contemporaryphilosophcrs 
have been much concerned with. I'll call it the problem of rontmt; it might 
just as well be called the problem of aboutness. I say a 'supposed' prob-
lem because part what is at issue is whether it really is a problem or 
not. It's this. Consider such representational items as beliefs, desires, 
intentions, experiences as of this or that, utterances, and so on: all 
have content or arc about something. How do such items manage to 
be have one specific content rather than another, to be about some-
thing determinate? This seems to be necessary if it is to be possible 
to pere<~ive or believe something determinate about the world, which 
could be true or false, and also if it is to be possible to desire or try 
or intend to do something in particular, which you might succeed or 
fail at. We need to understand how it is determined what a percep-
tual experience, belief, intention, etc. is about, what ito; content is, if 
we arc to understand how there can be a distinction between being 
correct or successful in relation to one content, as opposed to mis-
taken in relation to another content. The distinction between success 
and failure should have application both to perceptual experience and 
the cognitive auitudes, and to imentional action; so the supposed prob-
lem arises, if at all, in both categories. 
B. Now of course Vlittgenstein didn't use this terminolob'Y· But it's 
generally thought that his later philosophy, and especially the rule-
following considerations, have an important bearing on this supposed 
problem-even if it isn't generally agreed exactly what that is. He de-
velops twin critiques of two philosophical doctrines he seems equally 
opposed to, Platonism and psychologism. During the course of these 
critiques, he seems to take as a central target of auack a certain ten-
dency, the tendency to postulate intermediaries between mind and 
world, such as interpretations, as if these would help us to understand 
how mental states manage to acquire contents that arc about the 
world in determinate ways. It's now VCI)' familiar that Wittgcnstein re-
veals the futility of such intermediaries for purposes of understand-
ing content and aboutness. He exposes what we can call the regress of 
intnfm~tations. This expose we can regard as part of \Viugcnstcin 's 
negativt• response to the problem of content: he's showing us that <:er-
tain standard moves get nowhere. 
It is disputed whether the positive part of his response to the prol>-
lcm amounts to taking it seriously and solving it, or rather to dissolving 
it, making us sec it is not really a problem at all, unless we're in the 
grip of certain misleading pictures. But whichever way we end up in-
terpreting him, his positive response to the problem has seemed to 
many in some way to turn critically on appeals to Jmtctia•J, to uses and 
forms oflife. An issue here is whether the appeals to practice contribute 
to a solution or to a dissolution of the problem. I think it's fair to say 
the negative part ofWittgcnstcin 's view has had more attention than 
the positive part. 
C. I'll begin by rehearsing briefly the negath·c part of his response 
to the problem-which will be very familiar. I'll then go on to raise 
questions about the positive part of his response: what exactly is the 
role of his appeal to Jmtrlire? Why docs the appeal to practin~ get us 
anywhere at all with respect to the problem of content? How can it 
help either to solve, or to dissolve, the problem? In order to under-
stand the force of these questions, we need to trace the way in which 
the supposed problem of content arises equally for both the relation 
ofbelicfand perceptual experience to their ol~jects, on the one hand, 
and for the relation of trying and intention to their objects, on the 
other hand. That is, we have to appreciate the way the supposed prob-
lem arises in parallel, symmetrically, on the side of perceptual con-
tent and on the side of intentional content. (By tlw way, I usc 
'intentional content' throughout in the nontechnical sense of thr con-
lmt of intmtions.) The general form of my question is this: given the 
symmetry of the supposed problem with respect to perception and he-
lief on the one hand, and to action on the other, what explains 
Wittgenstcin 's apparently asymmetrical appeal to practice? Given the 
symmetry, how can practice have an asymmetrically basic role in the 
correct view of content and abontness? There seems to he a mismatch 
between the symmetry of the supposed problem and the asymmetry 
of his response. I'll consider some possible answers to these questions 
hl"iefly at the encl. But I don't so much try to answer them here as to 
articulate them. 
2. Mind, world a11d tile regress of intennediaries. 
A. It has been suggested that, in describing how mind and language 
make contact with the world, Wittgcnstcin's task is to steer between 
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Platonism, on the one hand, and psychologism or mentalism or Cartc-
sianism, on 1 he other hand. I Plat on ism responds to I he puzzle of about-
ness by appealing to some intrinsic power of objects thcmseln·s, 
whether these arc the ultimate worldly objects or rather abstract ob-
jens like mlt•s. This mysterious power of the ol~jects of mental states 
is a power somehow to draw tlw mind unto themselves, in a way that 
solves the problem of content. If the question arises of whether some-
one meant add two rather than quad two, and so ofwlwther he's wrong 
about addition or right about quaddition, it is in smut· way answet"l·cl 
hy the superior status of addition in this respect. Wittgenstein seems 
to reject this notion that ol~ects or rules have intrinsic mind-drawing 
powers as providing no understanding of contt·nt or ahoutness.:! 
B. Wittgt•nstdn also att<Kks a duster of views that can he seen as 
opposite to Platonism-psychologism, mentalism, Cartesian ism. The 
cemraltargct here is the idea that the problem of ahoutness is to he 
resolved hy appealing to some intrinsic power ofitt·ms on the side of 
the mimi (t·.g., images, formulations of rules, ('XJH'riences, feelings, 
etc.) to hridge tlw gap from tlw opposite direction, to indicate or point 
at the world in detenninatt· ways. And the intrinsic pointing power of 
the mind is supposed to be inckpendcnt in principk of the way the 
world really is. Not only is mistake· possible, it may he rampant; we may 
be globally cldmled, we may he the victims of a deceh·ing demon, or 
brains in vato;, and the world may he nothing like what we suppose. 
Morem·t·r, our intt·ntions may he hopekssly futile and indfectual. :'1/e\'-
crthclcss, our mental states ha\'e tlw contents in <JUl'stion-if they 
didn't, we couldn't he mistaken. \\'ittgenstein finds no more under-
standing of content ami ahoutnt•ss in this notion of 1 he mind's intrinsic· 
world-indicating powers than he docs in the notion of the world's in-
trinsic mind-drawing powers; tlw two gestures arc equally unhelpful.:! 
C. lrit makes st·nse neither to suppose the world has intrinsic power 
to draw the mimi to specific hits of itself, nor to suppose that the mind 
has intrinsic power to indicate specific bits of the world, then how is it 
possible fill· mental states to ha\"e contents that arc ahout the world in 
determinate ways? Sinct· neither supposition sheds any real light, a 
temptation arises to interpose intt·rmc~diaries to do til<' still-mysterious 
work of comwcting mind and world.l The distinction he tween Platonist 
and mentalist intermediaries is not always sharp: it's not always clear 
whether the intermt•diary nmnts as a distillation of tlw world, which 
draws the mimi to itself, snch as a Platonic form, or as a distillation of 
the mind, which points at the world, such as an interpretation. 
D. But it. doesn't matter; whichc\"er way a postulated intermediary 
faces, it doesn't work either. Intermediaries do nothing to explain about-
ness, but merely push the mystery back a step, giving rise to a fruitless 
regress. The point is familiar from many recent commentaries. Inter-
pretations are themselves open to interpretation; no interpretation in-
terprel'i itself. Inserting an interpretation between a representation and 
what is represented does not explain the connection between them. 
It merely substitutes the twin problems of a) what makes that, as op-
posed to some other, the right interpretation of the representation, and 
b) how the interpretation in tum gets to be about what is represented, 
rather than something else, or nothing at all. Since the relationship 
of the intermediary to the original items presupposes the very about-
ness it is supposed to explain, it doesn't explain it. Wittgenstcin gives 
many versions of this point; exposing the futility of the regress is one 
of the most characteristic moves of his later philosophy. To take just 
one example, from The Blue Book: How do I obey the order: "Pick a red 
flower"? Suppose we arc tempted to answer: By imagining a red patch 
and comparing it to the available flowers. But then how do I obey the 
order: "Imagine a red patch"?!> Further interpretations don't help. If 
we set off down this route, then, as Wittgenstein puts it, no course of 
action can be determined by a rule, because every course of action can 
be made out to accord with the rule (under some interpretation or 
another).6 
E. 'What is the import of this regress? Philosophers disagree. Some 
think it leads to a threatening kind of skepticism about the determi-
nacy of content, which needs to be taken seriously and may require 
some kind of skeptical solution in response, one that shows us how 
we can live with the regress. Call these skeptical views of the regress. 
(Kripke and Fogelin seem to be in this category.) 7 But others hold 
non-skeptical views. Some of the latter see the regress a'i part of a reductio: 
since it leads to an absurd conclusion, that content is impossible, 
some premise that gives rise to it must be identified and n.;jected. (In 
their different ways, Baker and Hacker, McDowell, and Pears seem to 
be in this category.) 11 Another variation on the non-skeptical view is 
to sec the regress as part of a transcendental argument concerning 
the conditions under which aboutness is possible. Aboutncss is pos-
sible; but it wouldn't be if it depended only on interpretation or sim-
ilar intermediaries; therefore it doesn't. (Lear seems to argue this way.) 9 
However, what the needed item is, is often left less clear than what it 
isn't. I should emphasize that my own view is firmly in the non skepti-
cal category; to but I refrain from arguing the point here, since my puz-
zle here applies to both the skeptical and the nonskeptical views. 
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J. Why does the appeal to pmdice help? 
A. Wittgenstein and his commentators have made the negative part 
of the view, the critique of the regress, reasonably clear. But they arc 
not as clear about the positi\·e part of the view, about exactly how prac-
tices figure in the correct response to the regr(•ss. There's an im-
pressive controver·sy among commentators about whether a 
community's practice plays an essential role in Wittgcnstein 's re-
sponse, or whether an individual's practice will do.ll Still more 
fundamentally, it isn't clear how the appeal to any practice, whether 
individual or community, functions in response to the regress point. 
B. Wittgenstein says that the regress shows that there is a way of 
following a rule that is not a matter ofinterpretation, hut is exhibited 
by what we call 'following a rule' in actual cases. We should not say 
that "whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule", 
but rather that any interpretation hangs in the air along with what it 
interpret<> and that interpretations do not determine mcanings.l2 
Now even such admirers of Wittgenstein as Hacker and Baker con-
cede that "This response docs not seem perspicuous"):\ It does not 
pinpoint the source of the error. Wittgcnstcin instructs us not to re-
gard actions according to rules as themselves interpretations. He 
comments that "interpretation" should be used f(>r the substitution 
of one expression of the rule for another)·! But of course there is a 
perfectly good sense in which actions according to rules are expres-
sions of the rule; so this instruction is not in itself very illuminating. 
He says that obeying a rule is a practice; hut he doesn't explain ex-
actly why use and practice might he thought to have any advantage 
over interpretations, images, feelings, and so on. Why might use and 
practice, for example, either end the regress, or keep it from arising, 
or make the apparent problem dissolve, given that use and practice are 
themselves ojJtm to multijJle interJn-elations-as his own abundant exam-
ples display?I5 From the premise that any act can be brought into ac-
cord with the rule by interpretation we can draw the absurd conclusion 
there is neither accord nor conflict with the rule. We arc then sup-
posed to infer that understanding a rule is manifested in acting on it, 
not only in interpreting it. But why docs this get us anywhere or help 
to avoid the absurd conclusion? The question was about what it is for 
an act to be in accord with a rule; how docs it help at all to respond 
by appealing to acting on the rule itself? Uses, practices, acts, forms 
of life don't interpret themselves any more than anything else does. 
In particular, a collection of acts, a practice, whether that of one per-
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son or of diflercm persons, does not in tcrprct itself any more than a 
si11glt•act docs-as, again, \\'iugcnstcin's own examples show. 
Let me spell out a bit further why practices don't seem to help in 
responding to the regress. Consider the case of a student we suppose 
to be trying to add two. Having added two up to I 000, he then goes 
on '1004, 1008, etc'. When challenged, he insists he's not making a 
mistake, that this is the same thing as he was doing before, this way 
of going on docs agree with the previous, this is what he had intended 
to do all along. In virtue of what might he he trying to add two but 
making a mistake, rather than trying to do something else and suc-
ceeding, or not trying to do anything determinate at all? \\'hat dues 
the diflercncc consist in between making a mistake in doing one 
thing, and cluing something else? And docsn 't this type of question 
generalize to the point at which it threatens all determinate content? 
Let's put aside without n1ore ado the familiar discredited answers: 
platonic rails, imerpretations, experiences, feelings, dispositions, etc. 
The challenge can be repeated in each case: in virtue of what docs 
somconc's feeling, disposition, or whatever, count as this one, as op-
posed to a slightly differellt one, which has coincided with the other 
up to now-so that mistake is possible? 
But now how can it help to appeal to his usc itsclf?-It's just that 
that we're trying to resolve our view ol1 What determines the con-
tent of tlw intention his uses express, a contt•nt such that it is an in-
tention to do this worM(v tlzi11g and 11ot that, and yet at the same time 
permits the possibility of mistake, of trying and failing. We don't want 
the answer to force us to say that, whatever he goes on to do, that is 
in fact what he was trying to do; we want to hold on to the norma-
tivity of content. It doesn't help us to appeal tn the agreement of the 
application in <JUCstion with his other applications up to now, because 
what's at issue just is what determines whet her those previous appli-
cations agree with this way of going on or tlwt one; they don't imcr-
pret tiH:msclvcs. It's no mm1•given that this usc or application just docs 
agree with that one, than it is that this t•xpcricnccjust docs agree with 
that one. If the problem about agreement arises, it arises for the 
content of acts in the public sphere as much as f()r the content of ex-
periences. 
C. Parallel remarks seem to apply to the agreement of the appli-
cation in question with applications hy other people. If there is a prob-
lem about the agreement of the applications made by one person, it 
is hard to sec why there is not equally a problem ahomthe agreement 
of the applications made by different people. IIi This is a point often 
made by those who do not n~gard the community to have an 
essential role in responding to the regrcss.17 Blackburn writ<~s: 
The members of a community stand to each other as the mo-
mentary time-slices of an individual do. So just as the original 
s<:cptic qm~rics what it is for om· person-time to be faithful to 
a rule adopted by a pre\·ious person-time, so the public scep-
tic queries what it is for otl<' person to be faithful to the same 
rule as that adopted by another. IN 
If we can respond to the latwr: we just do see each other this way, then 
why can we not also respond: I j1ut do sec my experiences or sensa-
tions this way? Why put one kind of agreement rather than another 
below bedrock, so that we cannot dig further? The mere contingency 
of any relevant agreement, whether within a practice or between sen-
sations, is not at issue. Rather, the issue is the obtaining of the agree-
ment to begin with. 'We just do happen to agree' takes f(>r· granted 
what the skeptic disputes, namely, that agreement obtains, whether 
contingent or not, as much as This sensation just is like that one' docs.l9 
To illustrate with the add-two case: why arc we any more entitled to 
help ourselves to the assumption that the student's saying '1004, .. .' 
docs not agree with what the otlwrs do, than the assumption that it 
docs not agree with his own prior applications? The regress-monger 
can insist that the student's saying '1004, .. .' does agree with what the 
others do, that this is what counts as doing the same thing. It all de-
pends on what is meant by 'agn~c· and 'same'. And that's the prob-
lem all over again. 
So, whether what's in question is agreement of one person's usc 
with the uses of other people or with his own prior uses, the mor<· basic 
point is that agreement with practices seems open to tlw regress-
monger's challenge just as much as agreement with anything clse.20 
There seems no particular basis for allowing that pranices or forms 
of life play the role of the given, arc capable of defl<~cting or reduc-
ing to absurdity skepticism about agreement, as opposed to something 
else. If skepticism about agrecnwnt makes sense at all, it seems to make 
as much sense for agrecnwnt in practice, in usc or form oflifi.·, as for 
anything else. This is not to be unduly impressed with the f(>nn of skep-
ticism in question, but merely to insist on applying it consistently, if 
at all. 
D. It may be suggcstl~d hcrt: that these difficulties support a skep-
tical view of\Vittgenstein's positive response to the problem of con-
tent: one that takes the problem seriously and offers a skeptical 
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solution that shows us how to live with it, rather than dissolving it. But 
viewing a solution in terms of practices as skeptical gets us nowhere 
toward understanding why such a solution has any advantages over 
a equally 'skeptical' solution in terms of any other sort of entity, 
such as sensations. If we can't have what is really wanted and we have 
to live with the regress, why bite one bullet rather than another? If 
there is no foundation, why appeal to practices instead of something 
else? 
On the other hand, it might be suggested that these difficulties 
support a non skeptical view. Perhaps practices aren't supposed to con-
tribute to solving a skeptical problem; that would be to take the skep-
ticism too seriously. Perhaps the appeal to practice is rather part of 
the dissolution of the problem, part of showing us we shouldn 'ttake 
the skepticism seriously and don't need a solution. But it's still not 
clear why the appeal to practice rather than something else rids us of 
the misguided pictures that generate the pseudo-problem. Why is it 
anr more therapeutic to say "this is just what we do" than it is to sar 
"this is just what we feel"? Perhaps we are entitled to help ourselves 
to a normative characterization of our practices (instead of trying, hope-
lessly, to establish a standard of correctness by reference to bodily mm·e-
ments not normatively identified). But why aren't we just as entitled 
to help ourselves to a normative characterization of experience (in-
stead of trying to establish a standard of correctness by reference to 
private sensations)? 
E. Our puzzle, then, is why practice has any advantage over the 
various discredited intermediaries, in either solving or dissolving the 
problem of content. Now Fogelin writes: 
So in the end, and the end is encountered almost at once, we 
arc told that a language-game is this, this and this. The italicized 
demonstrative is the /eitmotivofWittgcnstein's later philosophy.21 
\Ve can underscore our puzzle by comparing what 'Wittgenstein says 
about the demonstrative this as applied to sensations and their ilk, and 
as applied to what we do, uses. Compare the role of saying things like 
"1"/iiJ is sensationS", which Wittgenstein supposedly revealed to be idle, 
with the role of saying things like "This is what we do", which he gen-
erally seems to go in for. The background point to keep in mind for 
both cases is that, as he puts it, " ... one docs not define a criterion of 
identity by emphatically stressing the word 'this'." 22 
For sensations and the like, the emphatic demonstrative features 
prominently in the ceremonies whose idleness Wittgenstein exposes. 
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His interlocutor says: 
But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sen-
sation, hut only had the sensation? And now I simply associalt' 
names with sensations and usc these names in descriptions. 2:l 
He asks in response: Can I poilu to sensation S? What is this ceremony 
for, given that whatever is going to seem right to me is right? If I say 
"\Veil, I believe that this is the sensationS again", he replies briskly, 
"Perhaps you beliroe that you believe it." 2·1 
"But I can (inwardly) unckrtakc to call TI-llS 'pain' in the fu-
ture".-"But is it certain that you have undertaken it? Arc you 
sure that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate· your 
anent ion on your feeling?" 25 
How is he to know what colour he is to pick out when he hears 
'rcci'?-Quite simple: he is to takl·the colour whose image oc-
curs to him when he hears the word. -But how is he to know 
which colour it is 'whose image occurs to him'? :.!ti 
How do I recognize that this is red? "I sec that it is this; and 
then I know that that is what this is called." 
But what is this? 
I could not apply any rules to a fnivale transition from what is 
seen to words. Here tlw rull•s really would hang in the air; for 
the institution of their use is lacking. 27 
How does one point to an image? How docs one point twice 
to the same image? :!K 
And clo you know that what you are gi\"ing yourself this exhi-
bition of is pain and not, for example, a facial expression? ... 
This jJritlale exhibition is an illusion. 2!1 
So, there is a point about how om: person's private sensations over 
time could count as of the same type. There is a related point about 
how clillcrent persons' private sensations could count as of tlw same 
type: " ... nobody knows whether other people also have this or some-
thing else." :m ·when I suppose that I have got something my neigh-
bour has not, I want to say: "At any rate only I have got TI-llS." But, 
Wittgenstcin comes back, "What arc these words for? They serve no 
purpose." 31 The point seems to lw that the emphatic demonstrative 
is idle with respect to these issues about types of sensation and expe-
riential content. 
Is it similarly idle with respect to issues about types of action and 
intentional content, with respect to wlwl il is that we arc doing? If not, 
why not? !\2 Why docs Wittgenstein keep directing us to look at the 
usc? Why docs he write, for example: 
The arrow points only in the application that a living being 
makes of it.:\:\ 
and: 
[The truths of logic] are determined by a consensus of arliou: 
a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way. 
There is a consensus but it is not a consensus of opinion. \Vc 
all act the same way, walk the same way, count the same way.:H 
Pictures and images can't force particular applications or uses on us;35 
but neither can otlwr ajJplications or reactiom or uses. And Wittgenstcin says 
as much: 
Say I want someone to make a particular movement, say to raise 
his arm. To make it quite clear, I do the movement. This pic-
ture seems unambiguous till we ask: how docs he know that hr 
is to makr that movmumt ?-How docs he know at all what usc he 
is to make of the signs I give him, whatever they are?- :w 
Maybe the problem here is that the example of arm-raising to he fol-
lowed isn't itself a usc, but only a way of mentioning a use, a sign of 
a use. And perhaps " ... there is a way of giving the meaning of men-
tioned expressions which is not merely the substitution for them of 
other mentioned expressions, but of expressions in usr.":\i Wiugcn-
stcin says: 
One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a partic-
ular way.-1 do not, however, mean hy this that he is supposed 
to sec in those examples that common thing which 1-for 
some reason-was unable to express; but that he is now to rm-
pluy those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples 
is not an indirrcl means of explaining-in default of a be ncr. 
For any general definition can be misunderstood too. The 
point is that this is how we play the gamc.:n1 
But our worry is that uses are no less sul~jcct to multiple interpre-
tations than mentions or signs. And that 'one does not define a 
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criterion of identity by emphatic stressing of the word this', with re-
spect to uses any more than anything else. We may apply 'this' to a 
sensation or to an art without thereby determining the rdevant type 
oft he thing, whether otlwr things are relevantly similar, and what counts 
as 'going on in the same way'. Pt~rhaps we are cntitlt•d to shrug this 
off. But if we are entitled to shrug this off with respt•ct to uses, why 
not with respect to sensations too? \\'hy is the fornu:r at any ad\·an-
tagc? \\'hat motivates orjustilics the asymmetry in their treatment with 
respect to the emphatic demonstrative? As we've seen, it's not evident 
that this question can be any more readily answered for the practices 
of a community than those of an indi\•iduaJ.:l9 
F. Of course, 'Willgenstcin is acutely aware ofjust thest• issues. He 
points out that descriptions of rt~actions to rules presuppose under-
standing ofrulcs:lll He writes: "(I cannot give a rule in any way other 
than by means of an expn·ssion; for e\'en examples, if they arc meant 
to lw examples, are an expression for a rule like any other.)" But how 
docs this claim, that examples of how the rule applit~s count as ex-
pressions of the rule like any other, sit with his advin.·, at Philosophi-
mllnvrsli!falions 201, to distinguish between interpretations, which 
substitute one expression of a mle for another, and acts of applying 
or following rules? )noted <·arlicr the naturalness of assimilating acts 
of rule-f(>llowing to expressions of the rule. And I noted the way this 
assimilation makes mysterious what is gained by appealing to action, 
usc or practice, since the latter admit of multipk~ interpretations as 
much as any other cxpn·ssion of the rule. Indeed, acts admit of mul-
tiple interpretations wlwther they arc 'meant to he examples' or not. 
But Wittgenstein, of course, got there first. To drivt· that point home, 
consider this remark: 
Now what is doing the same with 100? -One might put the 
point I want to make here by saying, '99 is rlifkn·nt from I 00 
in any case; so how can one tdl whether something Wl' do to 
99 is the same as something we do to 100?' ·II 
Or this remark: 
h is no use, f(1r t•xample, to go back to the conn·pt of agree-
ment, because it is no mort·t·crtain that one anion is in agree-
ment with another, than that it has happened in accordance 
with a rule. 42 
So, to summarize, if' <H'Is or practices don't interpret themselves 
any more than anythin~ dse clues, why arc they any better placed than 
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the discredited entities either to solve, or to dissolve, the problem of 
coment? Wittgenstein writes: "One does not learn to follow a rule by 
first learning the use of the word 'agreement'. Rather, one learns the 
meaning of 'agreemcm' by learning to follow a rule". 43 The ability 
to follow rules is fundamental; forms oflife arc the given. But why is 
it any more helpful to say: "These public acts just do agree with that 
way of going on, that is bedrock" than to say: "These private sensa-
tions just do agree with that way of going on, that is bedrock"? The 
public/private distinction seems to cut across the issue of what con-
stitutes agreement, and so f~lr we have found no reason for that to be 
any less an issue in the realm of practice than in the realm of sensa-
tion. Given the difficulty of making sense of how anything, practices 
included, could be intrinsically self-interpreting, how does appeal to 
practice show how aboutness and content arc possible, either by pre-
venting the regress from arising, or showing us how to live with it, while 
appeal to more traditional givens does not? 
My main purpose has been to articulate these questions, not to an-
swer them. But I will briefly comment on some of the various possi-
ble responses. 
4. Skeptical or pragmatic responses. 
A. As already indicated, it's not an adequate answer to say that the 
solution practices provide is a skeptical one, that nothing underwrites 
content and we just, contingently, happen to agree in doing this 
rather than that. This answer simply fails to take the point: the prob-
lem, if there is one at all, runs to as much to action (nonlinguistic as 
well as linguistic) as to sensation or anything else. Unless it's defused, 
it deprives us even of arbitrary, groundless decisions. So we can't take 
the problem seriously and then fall back on the latter, however grimly. 
If the absurd conclusion is in force we're not entitled to talk about 
what we just do, whether contingently or not, about our practices or 
decisions or choices or anything intentional in the way needed, be-
cause they are content-presupposing; this would he a case of the skep-
tic helping himself to resources his own argument denies him. That 
is, the full force of the skeptical view dissolves our capacities for in-
tentional action, for trying and choice, however arbitrary, as much as 
for perception and thought. It takes the ground out from under the 
feet of pragmatism and conventionalism, as much as Platonism and 
psychologism. It rules out appeals by the skeptic to our intentional 
responses, our attributions, our constructions, our investigations, our 
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procedures of verification or ratification, etc. Again, the point is sim-
ply that these items on side of practice art• contl·nt-presupposing, so 
can have no privileged role in solving, or dissolving, the problem of 
content. \\I'Jtcther this point has been adequately recognized in some 
recent discussions 44 is a question I do not pursue here. 
B. Some ofWittgenstein 's remarks about the lat·k of need for the-
oretical justification of what we 'just do" suggest that his appeal to prac-
tice might be understood to express a kind of pragmatism akin to 
Hume's putting his skepticism aside to play backgammon. Our en-
gagement in life doesn't so much answer, as silenn~ and render aca-
demic, our worries about how content and ahoutness are possible. In 
the "seeing as" sections toward the end of tlw hwt•stigathms, Wittgen-
sLCin asks whether in aspect shifts we really st•e sonwthing different, 
or only interpret what is seen diiTerently. He then nmunents that in-
terpreting can be recognized because it involvt~s tlw forming of hy-
potlu•st!S that might prove false; whereas seeing, he suggests, isn't open 
to the same sort of verification. Perhaps, then, Wl~ t·;m regard intt~r­
pretation as a cognitive and theoretical matter and contrast its cog-
nitive status, similarly, with the noncognith·e status ofpractke, which 
is not a matter of fonning hypotheses that may he tniC or l:tlsc. This 
view might be applied to his remark that what has to he acn~pted, tlw 
given, is forms of life. ·we find ourselves in the midst of forms of life 
and practices; we just are alive and active; this needs ancl admits of 
no justification. Our actions as living hcings arc not hypotheses; con-
cepts ;u·e expressions of om· interests. Moreover, higher f(mns of life 
and activity, such as our uses of language, are not discontinuous with 
more primitive ones. In the midst of life and language, Wl' haw no 
usc for hypotheses about how content and about ness arc possible. We 
don't need such theories in order to know how to act; we just get on 
with things. 
This kind of'backgammon pragmatism' also misses the point. Of 
course we just get on with life; no one denies that. But life is as much 
experience as action; and we also 'just do' reflect on our lcmns of life 
and try to understand how they relate to what we experience and in-
tenet. Distaste for theoretical reflection is irrelevant to the <JUCstions 
I'm raising about the role of practice in respondin~ to the problem 
of content; it just changes the subject. 
C. We might consider a comparison with Kant on the primacy of 
practical reason. According to Kant, thcorctic:al rt~ason is limited and 
cannot demonstrate the reality of our freedom; hut we can and must, 
as bcin~s endowed with practical reason, act undt~r the assumption 
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of freedom. It is altogether proper for practical reason to fill the void 
left by theoretical reason. Perhaps we should see Wiugcnstcin as say-
ing that we cannot understand theoretically how content, including 
the content of our actions, is possible; but nevertheless, as rational be-
ings, we can and must act under the assumption that it is, and that 
this is altogether proper. Perhaps forms of life are given for Wittgen-
stcin in something like the way that freedom and the other postulates 
of practical reason arc given for Kant. 
5. Contextualism. 
A. But let's now try a different tack. Baker and Hacker emphasize 
something that's surely right, namely, that the notions of practice and 
of agreement are not appealed to by Wiugcnstein in the role of in-
termediaries, competing with other failed intermediaries, but which, 
unlike the others, happen to do the trick.45 A practice, they say, is not 
a third thing, standing between the rule and its applications. Rather, 
the relation between a rule and acts of following it is what they call 
intemal: this is "what we call" following that rule; the rule and its ap-
plications make contact in language. As they put it: "This rule would 
not be the mlc that it is, nor would this act he the act that it is, if this 
act were not in accord with this rule. Because the relation is internal, 
no intermediary can be interposed between its two terms to effect a 
connection." ·Hi An internal relation is a relation of interdependence 
that runs to the very identity of the items in question. Hacker and Baker 
identify a mistake where the whole chain of reasoning leading to the 
regress takes off, namely, a failure to appreciate the interdependent 
individuation of rules and their uses or applications. 'The apparent 
logical gulf between a rule and its 'extension' arises from the mistaken 
assumption that understanding a rule is at least partly independent 
of how it is projected on to actions. But however it is formulated or 
explained, a rule is understood only ifit is correctly projected. To he 
ignorant or mistaken about what acts arc in accord with it is to be ig-
norant or mistaken about what the rule is." 47 And W'iugcnstcin writes: 
Don't I know, then, which game I want to play until I have played 
it? ... so it is impossible for me to be certain what I am intend-
ing to do? And if that is nonsense-what kind of super-strong 
conncxion exists between the act of intending and the thing 
intended? ·111 
B. These remarks lead us to consider the possibility that the con-
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tent of a rule someone understands and intends to follow, and the 
set of acts that constitute acting on it, arc not two indcpenden t items. 
Rather, the content of the intention may be determined by its ron text, 
including actions identified in a world-iil\'olving way. \Vhat we can call 
a broadly mnlt•.-.;tualistvicw ofWiugcnswin is suggested by Pettit & Mc-
Dowell's Introduction to the Subjt•fl, 11wught ami Context volume, and 
more rece111ly by 1\lcDowell's ~Meaning and lntcntionality":l!l A par-
allel contextualist view about perceptual content would deny that the 
colllelll of a perceptual experience is constitutively indept·ndent of 
the worldly ol~jects of pcrn·ption. While contcxtualist views differ in 
various respet·ts, they hm•t• in common the denial that contt•nt is con-
stitutively indt·pendent of worldly nmtext. So, f(H· exam pit•, they re-
ject individualist and internalist views ahout contt•nt, though difler·ent 
versions may appeal to various aspects of a sul~jcct's context or envi-
ronment (social, physical, etc.), and in diffen·nt ways (through nor-
mal causes, teleology, etc) 
llllernal relations ami contt~xt-ckpendent determination of con-
tent may seem to make mistake impossible, to leave no room for the 
difference ht·twt•en a mistake in trying to follow one rule and success 
in following a different rule. But the possibility of mistake can he ac-
commodated within a nmtextualist \'icw, so long as the relevant con-
text is broadly enough understood. Content can be determined by 
global context, while mistakes are local, exceptional. 50 This familiar 
kind of point about tlw parasitic character of mistake is suggested in 
\'arious plaet~s by Wittgcnstein; it's made in a different way, appeal-
ing to normal causes, by Burge's perceptual externalism. 
C. Acontextualist reading ofWittgcnstein may well he correct; this 
would he a nonskeptical reading. If this type of response is effective 
ancl distinct from the discredited Platonist view, it is becaust• it rejects 
the mind-world dualism that gives rise to the apparent problem, so 
there is no mind- world gap to bridgt· and no regress can get started. 
As McDowell puts it, the correct response to the regress is to realiz~· 
that we ought not to suppose we have to start with something-what 
the person has in mind-that just stands there'. Rather, a normative 
link to the ol~jt·ctive world may he csst•tHial to tlw very identity of what 
someone has in minciJ•I Whether this response is effecth•t• I cannot 
discuss here, though I'm sympathetic to it. But let us assume for the 
sake of argument it is. This would not in itself answer my question. 
There would still be an issue about how a contextualist reading ad-
cln·sses the issue I've been pressing about the mismatch ht·twt•en the 
symmetry of apparent problem for pt•rception and for action, and the 
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asymmetry of response in terms of practice. 
'While developing.a contextualist view in Nalural Reasom, I made 
a suggestion about the special role of practice, which I no longer find 
satisfactory. There I wrote that Wiugenstein applied the point that noth-
ing could possibly be self- interpreting to practices and behaviour as 
much as anything else: 
His point is not simply that experiences can't interpret them-
selves, but that it is a mistake to conceive of the relation between 
the mind and the world in such a way that the need to postu-
late intrinsically self-interpreting entities of any kind arises .... He 
appeals to practices ... not as [such cntilies], but because he con-
ceives them as identified in relation to and constituth•cly en-
gaged with the world. His appeal to them is in effect a 
repudiation of the conception of the mind as independent of 
the world that gives rise to the problem which makes [self-in-
terpreting entities] seem necessary .... .it is far easier to relin-
quish this dualistic conception of mind and world with respect 
to activity than with respect to experience .... Which practice a 
given bodily event belongs to ... [is a question) that it is hardly 
tempting to answer without reference to the world. 52 
I no longer find this satisfactory, for at least tvvo reasons. 
First, even if it is correct as it stands, it doesn't go far enough. We 
need to know why it is easier to relinquish the mind-world dualism and 
the world-independent conception of content for activity than expe-
rience, if indeed it is. Docs this greater case merely give rhetorical sig-
nificance to the appeal to practice, when in principle an independent 
appeal to the correct nondualistic or contextualist conception of ex-
perience would have done just as well? Or is there some asymmetry 
such that the appeal to practice grounds the correct view of experi-
ence? 
We can adopt parallel versions of contexmalism, for the content 
of intentional action, and for the content of perceptual experience; 
there is no obvious basis for asymmetry here. Contextualism, the de-
nial that mental content is constitutively independent of worldly con-
text, seems to be neutral as between an orientation to action and 
intentional content, and an orientation to perception and experien-
tial content. Ao; a result, it docsn 't illuminate any special or a!>-ymmetrical 
role of practice in diagnosing and dissolving the problem of content. 
That problem arises, if at all, symmetrically, on the perception side 
as well as on the action side. It is equally one about the relationship 
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between a perceptual experience and the worldly entity it is about, 
and the relationship between an intention or a trying to follow a par-
ticular rule and the action that counts as sucn·ss. In so far as contex-
tualism provides a dissolution of the problem, there is equally scope 
for it in relation to perception anrl to action. Given this symmetry, we 
may still wonder how pra<:tice acquires a special, asymmetrical role 
in a cont<:xtualist diagnosis. 
Our puzzle was about the mismatch between symmetry of supposed 
problem of content, for pen:eption and for action, and aspnmetry of 
response, in terms of practice. Since the contextualist response shares 
the symmetry of the supposed problem, it can't account for the mis-
match. We picked up an important point articulated by Hacker and 
Baker, that practices were not intermediaries that succeeded where 
others failed. Rather the appeal to practice intrncluces the idea of in-
ternal relations. This led us to consider that a contcxtualist repudia-
tion of mind-world dualism may dissolve the prohk·m of content. But 
even if these thoughts arc along the right lines generally, they don't 
orient us toward practice or agency in particular, so they still haven't 
illuminated the special role of practice. 
Consider a related suggestion about the special role of practice. 
If a nonskcptical view of\Vittgcnstcin 's concerns is corn~ct, then there 
is no reason why we shouldn't treat certain ordinary common s<·ns<· 
truths as a default position, such as the truth that our practice is one 
of adding, not of quadding. We arc entitled to hdp ourselves to such 
nonnative characterizations of our practices; the assumption that we 
are not leads to absurdity. Hut there is no actual practice of naming 
private Sl:nsations. There arc no ordinary common sense truths about 
practices f(H· the private sensation linguist to appeal to, comparable 
to truths about our public practices. So, as things actually are, tlwrc 
is an asymmetry herc.5:l 
But this asymmet11· results from taking what I'll call a slanted virw. 
Suppose we are entilled to help ourselves to the common sense vit·w 
of our practices, normatively identified. Blll wt· can equally help our-
selves to the common sense view of our experiences, normatively 
identified, as giving us knowledge of the world. For short, call these 
the 'gone!' views of action and of experience. The good view of ex-
perience contrasts with what we can call for short a 'bad' ,·iew of ex-
perience, in terms of private sensations or sense-data. The good view 
of action also contrasts with a 'had' view of action, which tries to set 
up a standard of correctness f<>r action by pointing to movements non-
normatively identified. 
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If we accept the good views as correct,51 my point can be put like 
this: The point of the polemic against the bad \icw of experience should 
he to make us happy to accept the good view as the default. But why 
do we need the idea of practice to do that? Normative, common sense 
characterizations of experience may not he available to the private lin-
guist, but they arc to us. If we take a slanted view and compare the 
good view of practice with the had \iew of experience, it looks as if 
there's an asymmetry. This is what we do when we note the availabil-
ity of ordinary common sense facts about our public practices, and 
that nothing comparable is available to the private sensation linguist. 
But the asymmetry depends on taking this slanted view; why look at 
things this way to begin with? If we compare the good views in each 
case, the asymmetry disappears. We can help ourselves to the com-
mon-sense view of experience, normatively characterized, as the de-
fault position, as wen as to the good view about practice. But then why 
docs appealing to practice in particular help us to achieve the good 
view? It looks as if there is a sclf:standing point abolll experience, as 
wen as one abotU practice. If you assume that Wittgenstein is appeal-
ing to practice to nudge us over to the good view about experience, 
the asymmetry is stin puzzling: why does practice have any advantage 
in making the point about our entitlement to these default positions? 
On the other hand, if we compare the bad views in each case, we may 
suppose that practice has an advantage: but that supposition brings 
us dose to what I can the m_vt/1 of the giving. 55 
My second reason for being dissatisfied with what I wrote cm·lier 
is that I now suspect that it is not easier to relill()llish the mind-world 
dualism for activity than for experience. On the contrary, there is a 
deep tendency in philosophy to assume that, however sophisticated 
and far ranging our skepticism, we can nevertheless always l~tn back 
on our own agency. Even when we have rid ourselves of passively 
given experiences, even when we have distanced ourselves from the 
empiricists by turning our skeptical gaze back onto the contents of 
our own experiences, we still find it very dillicult to get our capacity 
f(u· choice, however futile and arbitrary, under our skeptical gaze. Resid-
ual naivete about agency tends to support some subtly sophisticated 
or skeptical views about other things. 
6. The myth of the givi11g. 
A. This second reason is illustrated in a discussion elsewhere of 
views that han~ been attrihmcd to Kant, concerning the transcendental 
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role of synthesis in relation to the possibility of contentful experience 
and tht• unity of concepts and of consciousness. 56 I'll gesture briefly 
toward some of the points made there, and then raise some related 
isstws about \Vittgenstcin 's views. 
Kant admits the essential role of activity in reladon to the content 
of perceptual experience, and so he n;jects the myth of the given, as 
the slogan has it. He n;jects the idea that the content of perceptual 
experil·ncc can be taken as an unproblcmatk primitive, which tlw mind 
passively receives from the world, a matter of pure input. Rather, the 
spontarwous activity of synthesis can he vkwcd as having a transcen-
dental role in making contentful experience possible, as the source 
of the unity a concept impos{~S on its instances (and thus, to shifllo 
more modern terminology, of determinate content). Moreover, this 
view can be taken in a way that neither presupposes tlu~ unity of 
things as they arc in themsch·cs, nor simply takes for granted our ex-
perience of empirical ol~jects. "Combination", Kant writes, "docs not 
lie in the objects";;,; the unity a concept imposes on the variety of its 
instances can be vicwl~d transcendentally as reflecting the sponta-
neous activity of syntlwsis. 
B. However, it is mw thing to n;jcct the myth of the gi\'l·n in re-
lation to the conteJH of perceptual experience, and another thing to 
bring into doubt the complementary conception of the content ofin-
tentional acts, which we can call'the myth of the giving'. This involves 
the idea that the content of intemional ;t<:tion can he taken as un-
problematically primitive, something generated by the activl~ mind, 
a matter of pure output. I shall try briefly to explain how this idea may 
seem to arise from the transcendental role of spontaneous synthesis. 
Spontaneous synthesis, whether viewed transcendentally or em-
pirically, is conceived as essentially involving our activity or agency, 
what we do rather than merely what happens in or to us, and hence 
the possihilityofintentionswith content. Intentional action, however 
spontaneous, has content, just as much as perceptual experience 
docs. So any general role played by the activity of spontaneous syn-
thesis in making experience possible will he a content-presupposing 
role. It is important hen· to distinguish the (:ontento; oftlw intentions 
associated with intentional acl<> of syntlwsis from the contents so syn-
thesizl~d; the relevant pn~supposed contents are the former. \\'hilc no 
particular intentional content and no particular act need he presup-
posed, the transcendental role of spontaneous synthesis will at least 
presuppose that intentional content in this sense is possible. 
However, the issu<·s ahout the unity of concepts and of con-
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sciousness arise for the content of intentions as much as for experi-
ential content. If there arc problems about how contentful experience 
is possible, there arc parallel problems about how comemful inten-
tions are possible. The basic issue is how content of any kind is pos-
sible; it applies equally to intentional and experiential content. How 
then can the activity of synthesis have the transcendental role of mak-
ing content possible, when any role it plays will presuppose that in-
tentions with content arc possible?511 The view that conceptual unity 
depends on the tnmsccndental role of the activity of synthesis this leaves 
unexplained the source of the unity presupposed by conceiving of syn-
thesis as an activity to begin with, as an expression of agency as op-
posed to merely a series of natural events. The possibility of contentful 
acts of spontaneous synthesis cannot play the tnmsccndental role of 
making it possible for acts of spontaneous synthesis to have content. 
The spontaneity of synthesis does not help; no act can determine its 
own content. Since intentional activity has content, if we need to 
know how content is possible to begin with, we need to know how in-
tentions and action arc possible as much as how experience is possi-
ble. If we help ourselves to the assumption that contcntful actions arc 
possible, in order to view the activity of symhesis as playing a tran-
scendental role in making contentful experience possible, we simply 
push the question back from: 'how is contentful experience possible?', 
to: 'how is contentful action possible?'. To suppose that this last ques-
tion does not arise while the former docs, or that the content of in-
tentions can be taken as unproblematically primitive in explaining how 
the content of experience is possible, is to succumb to the myth of 
the giving. The idea that the content of intentions reflects the pure 
output of a spontaneously active mind is no less problematic than the 
complementary idea that the content of perceptual experience reflect'> 
pure input from the world, passively received by the mind. 
These points apply to a position that regards the possibility of ex-
periential content as needing explanation, but in giving this expla-
nation takes for granted the possibility of intentional content, which 
embeds similar problems, so giving rise to a regress. Is this Kant's po-
sition, with respect to the transcendental role of spontaneous l>"}'llthesis? 
If so, then he fails to overcome the myth of the giving. I am not here 
addressing issues about the correct interpretation of Kant. 59 At least 
some interpretations of Kant leave him open to these points. Further 
e\•iclcnce would come from considering Kantian ethics, and the way 
in which the content of the categorical imperative expresses the au-
tonomy of the rational will. 
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C. More generally, however, and apart from difficult issues about 
the interpretation of Kant, there is a danger of incoherence in the 
fundamentally modern idea that Wf~ do the classifying of the world, in 
a way not determined by the world. This idea echoes Kant's claim that 
"combination does not. .. lie in the ol~jects": as if by appealing to what 
we do we somehow get beneath problems of unity and content-deter-
mination. Here again we find the myth of the gh·ing. It is a myth be-
cause intentional acts presuppose (in virtue of being imcmional and 
hence having content) classification, unification under concepts or 
by reference to object'\, as mm:h as experience or anything else docs. 
Moreover, this point applies to acts of classification as much as to any 
other kind of act. Acts that classify themselves or determine their 
own content are as much a myth as experiences that classify thcmsdves 
or determine their own content. Appealing to what we do no more 
gets beneath issues about unity and contelll than appealing to what 
we experience does. For it to!)(' determined what we arc doing when 
we act (whether our act is one of classification or otherwise) already 
requires our act have content. The world and our experiences may 
not classify themselves, but then m~ither do our actions; we need to 
make sense of all of these truths together. 
D. So, the myth of the giving merits n;jection as much as the 
myth of the given. To reject the myth of the given while holding onto 
the myth of the giving leads away fhmt realism in various directions. 
But if we reject the myth of the giving as well, this m~ed not he the 
case. W<· can correct the traditional philosophical subordination of 
agent to subject without going to the opposite extreme. We Gill adopt 
a sophisticated, activity-laden view of experiential content, without tak-
ing intentional content as primitive in the ways I\·c associat<·d with 
the myth of the giving. What is needed, rather, is to understand why 
it is no accident that only percci\·crs arc agents, as well as why it is no 
accident that only agcnto; arc perceivers: to understand the int<~rdc­
pcncknn~ of perception and ;u:tion. I sec no reason to think this can-
not lw done compatibly with realism. 
E. There are, of course, many similarities between Kant and 
Wittgcnstein. Both reject the myth of the given, the conception of per-
ception as pure input from world to mind, by reference to our activ-
ity, what we do. \Vittgenstcin,likc Kant, seems to be committed to some 
version of a theol}'/practicc distinction. I've already suggested how 
Wittgenstcin might be regarded as sharing something like Kant's view 
of the primacy of the practicaJ.1il1 
One response to the questions I ha\'e been raising ahnut Wittgcn-
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stein's appeal to practice would be to hold that his position is one-
sided in something like the way I've suggested Kant's may be. No doubt 
Wittgenstein did conceive of the content of experience as infused hy 
our activities or practices, rather than as the given. But it is a further 
question whether he gave the content of our actions an asymmetri-
cally fundamental or privileged role, which I have suggested is diffi-
cult to defend. If so, Wittgenstein and Kant may share a one-sided ness 
in these respects and a susceptibility to the myth of the giving. 
It is not clear to me that the one-sided view ofWiugenstcin would 
be correct. Some of his remarks about action and willing are diflicuh 
to reconcile with this view.6I McDowell's reading rejects the assump-
tion that Wiugenstein's appeal to custom should be understood as part 
of a constructive account, and so in terms that do not presuppose mean-
ing and understanding.62 The one-sided view may seem to depend 
on the constructivist assumption that McDowell rejects. However, the 
basic point here doesn't depend on the constructivist assumption; it 
merely insists that any entitlement to presuppose content be applied 
e\'enhandedly. If we reject the constructivist assumption for sensations 
and experiences as well as for customs and practices, the special role 
of the Iauer is still unexplained. A rather deflationary explanation might 
be offered at this point: perhaps the emphasis on practice in Wiugen-
stein 's philosophy merely ser.'es to cotTectthe undue contrary emphasis, 
still prevalent despite Kant, on input and causes and cognition and 
the subject, as opposed to output and effects and the will and the agent. 
F. However, a bolder response would be to challenge an implicit 
premise of what I've said so far, which is shared by many commenta-
tors on Wiugenstein. This is the premise that Wiugcnstein 's response 
to the problem of content actually docs give practice a special or 
asymmetrical role to begin with, that his references to forms of life 
can be assimilated to his references to practice, and have some es-
sentially practical force. If this premise is false, the explanation l'\'e 
called for is unneeded. Wittgenstcin docs not set out the issues about 
content separately for perception and belief on the one hand, and 
for action on the other, but rather interleaves them. This may sug-
gest the right way to think about forms of life. Perhaps we should not 
try to disentangle the parallel versions ofissues about content for per-
ception and the cognitive attitudes, on the one hand, and for action 
on the other, and then wonder how the view thus tidied up gets 
skewed toward practice, and whether he hasn't lapsed from one myth 
into the other. Perhaps, instead of assimilating Wittgenstein 'stalk of 
forms of life to his emphasis on practices, as is often done, we should 
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do the reverse.·. That would be to reacl his appeal to J(wms of life not 
in terms of a practice-orientc.·d asymmetry that involves him in any-
thing like the myth of the giving. hut rather as a way of avoiding both 
myths by n·rognizing the interdq>t'JHil'nce of experic.·ncc and prac-
tice within J<mns oflife. The question remains how this co•n·ction of 
the usual \'icw would mesh with whatever the right response is to the 
problem ofnmtent. But at lea'ittlw mismatch puzzle would he removed. 
I have not tried to resolve the interpretative issues I've raised, or 
to claim that either Wittgcnstl'in or 1\mll definitely dm~s sucnnnh lO 
the myth of tlw giving. My point has been more preliminary: merely 
to trace the way in which Wittgenstein's philosophy. like Kant's, re-
veals a danger of moving from a mistaken conception of experience 
into an equally mistaken conception of agency. 
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